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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Alexander Vincent Collins appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation. On appeal, he argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied his due process 
rights when it denied his motion to augment the record, and that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Collins approached two men placing boots on illegally parked vehicles and 
threatened them with a shotgun. (PSI, pp.86-87.) The state charged Collins with two 
counts of aggravated assault and an enhancement for use of a firearm during the 
commission of a crime. (R., pp.31-32.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Collins pleaded 
guilty to one count of aggravated assault and the state dismissed the remaining counts. 
(R., pp.90-91; see also 3/13/2008 Tr., p.1, L.12 - p.2, L.7; p.12, L.18- p.13, L.5.) The 
district court entered a withheld judgment in 2008 and placed Collins on probation for 
four years. (R., pp.106-11.) 
Later that year, the state alleged that Collins violated his probation by 
absconding supervision. (R., pp.114-15.) Collins admitted the violation. (R., pp.127-
28.) The district court revoked the withheld judgment, imposing and executing a 
sentence of five years with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.131-32.) 
At the end of that period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Collins' 
sentence and placed him on probation for three years. (R., pp.141-43.) 
In July, 2011, the state alleged that Collins violated his probation by (1) failing to 
attend and successfully complete his programming, (2) using marijuana on or about 
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May 17, 2011, (3) using marijuana on or about July 20, 2011, (4) changing residences 
without permission, (5) failing to report to Probation and Parole as instructed, and (6) 
failing to pay his fines. (R., pp.158-60.) Collins admitted the first three violations and 
the balance were dismissed. (R., p.169; see also 9/1/2011 Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.19, L.9.) 
The district court revoked Collins' probation and executed his underlying sentence. (R., 
pp.174-75.) Collins filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's order revoking 
his probation. (R., pp.182-84.) 
Pending appeal, Collins filed a motion to augment the settled record with 
transcripts from (1) the May 8, 2008 sentencing hearing, (2) the May 14, 2009 probation 
violation admission hearing, (3) the June 11, 2009 probation violation disposition 
hearing, (4) the January 7, 2010 jurisdictional review hearing, and (5) the September 1, 
2011 probation violation admission hearing. (Motion To Augment And To Suspend The 
Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof (hereinafter "Motion To 
Augment"), filed June 12, 2012.) The state did not object to the preparation and 
inclusion of the transcript from the September 1, 2011 probation violation admission 
hearing, but objected to Collins' motion to prepare and include all the other transcripts. 
(Objection In Part To "Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And 
Statement In Support Thereof," filed June 14, 2012.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted 
Collins' motion for the transcript of the September 1, 2011 probation violation admission 
hearing, but denied his request for the remaining transcripts. (Order, filed July 6, 2012.) 
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ISSUES 
Collins states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Collins due process and 
equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested 
transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Collins' probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. 
Collins' sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Collins failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with 
irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Collins failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion either by revoking his probation or by not sua sponte reducing his sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Collins' Claim That His Due Process Or Equal Protection Rights Were Violated By The 
Denial Of His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Irrelevant Transcripts 
Lacks Merit 
A. Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Collins filed a motion to augment the 
record with the as-yet unprepared transcripts of the May 8, 2008 sentencing hearing, 
the May 14, 2009 probation violation admission hearing, the June 11, 2009 probation 
violation disposition hearing, the January 7, 2010 jurisdictional review hearing, and the 
September 1, 2011 probation violation admission hearing. (Motion To Augment.) The 
Idaho Supreme Court granted Collins' motion as it related to the September 1, 2011 
probation violation admission hearing transcript but denied his motion as it related to the 
other transcripts. (Order, filed July 6, 2012.) 
Collins now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with the May 8, 2008 sentencing hearing, the June 11, 2009 probation violation 
disposition hearing, and the January 7, 2010 jurisdictional review hearing, the Idaho 
Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection 
and denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-16.) 
Collins' argument is without merit. First, if this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, 
Collins has failed to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho Supreme 
Court's order denying his motion. Alternatively, on the merits, due process and equal 
protection require the state only to provide a record sufficient for appellate review of the 
errors alleged. Because the denied transcripts are not relevant to, much less necessary 
for, appellate review of the district court's order revoking Collins' probation (the only 
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issue over which this Court has jurisdiction), Collins has failed to show any error in the 
Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his motion to augment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals, Collins Has Failed To 
Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho Supreme Court's 
Order Denying His Motion To Augment 
In State v. Morgan, Docket No. 39057, 2012 Op. No. 38 (Ct. App. July 10, 2012), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the 
appellant his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the record on 
appeal with various transcripts. In doing so, the Court "disclaim[ed] any authority to 
review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion 
made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that 
the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other 
law." Morgan at 3. Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to 
the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision 
and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court." kt The Court, however, "deem[ed] it 
within [its] authority ... to evaluate and rule on [a] renewed motion" if, for example, "the 
completed appellant's brief and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or 
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expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for additional 
records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support a renewed 
motion." isl To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Collins' 
arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho Supreme 
Court's order denying his motion to augment the record with transcripts that are 
unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. 
D. In The Alternative, Collins Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To 
The Requested Augmentation 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Collins' claim, all of his arguments fail. 
As in Morgan, Collins argues that he is entitled to the additional transcripts because, he 
claims, the failure to provide them is a violation of his constitutional rights to due 
process, equal protection, and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-16.) This is not "new information or justification for [Collins'] 
motion to augment the record." See Morgan at 3. Even if it were, his arguments still 
lack merit. 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is sufficient 
for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below." 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citations omitted). The 
state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide 
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." 
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 
102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial 
record that are germane to consideration of the appeal") (internal citations omitted). To 
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demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show that any 
omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 
92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968). To show prejudice, Collins "must 
present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a 
fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). 
Collins' appeal is timely only from the district court's November 14, 2011 order 
revoking his probation. (See R., p.182 (appeal filed on November 17, 2011).) Collins 
argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by 
denying his motion to augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared 
transcripts from the the May 8, 2008 sentencing hearing, the June 11, 2009 probation 
violation disposition hearing, and the January 7, 2010 jurisdictional review hearing 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-16), but he has failed to explain, much less demonstrate, how 
those transcripts are necessary to decide the only issue over which this Court has 
jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no indication that the court relied upon anything 
said at those previous hearings as a basis for its decision to revoke his probation. 
Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented to the district court in 
relation to the revocation of Collins' probation, they were never part of the record before 
the district court and are not properly considered for the first time on appeal. See State 
v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering 
a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review of the 
record made below'' and "will not consider new evidence that was never before the trial 
court"); also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) 
("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and consider new 
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evidence."). Collins has failed to show how the requested transcripts are relevant to 
any issue raised on appeal. 
Collins relies on the Court of Appeals' statement from State v. Hanington, 148 
Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is 
ordered into execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing 
when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) According to 
Collins, this language from Hanington requires augmentation with transcripts of all 
hearings from sentencing to the revocation of his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-
14.) The Court in Morgan, however, held that this interpretation of Hanington is too 
broad. Morgan at 4. The Court clarified that although it "will not arbitrarily confine 
[itsel·~ to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the revocation of 
probation . . . that does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and 
including sentencing are germane." & (emphasis original). Rather, the Court will 
simply consider the portions of the record before the trial court which are relevant to the 
ultimate issue on appeal, in this case, the revocation of Collins' probation. & 
Collins also relies on State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20, 843 P .2d 170 (Ct. App. 
1992), as "[f]urther support for [his] position." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) Collins' reliance 
on Warren is misplaced. Warren was placed on probation following an aggravated 
battery conviction. Warren, 123 Idaho at 21,843 P.2d at 171. Two years later, Warren 
was charged with a new crime and his probation was revoked in his aggravated battery 
case, but his sentence was reduced. & Despite the reduction, Warren filed a Rule 35 
motion, which was denied. &_ On appeal, Warren challenged the denial of his Rule 35 
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motion in the aggravated battery case. In addressing this claim, the Court of Appeals 
noted the absence of either a presentence report or a transcript from the sentencing 
hearing in the aggravated battery case and concluded that "[w]ithout a more complete 
record and no argument by Warren as to why the sentence was unreasonable," there 
was no support for Warren's claim that the district court abused its discretion in relation 
to the sentence reduction or the denial of Rule 35 relief. kl 
Collins argues that Warren supports his position that he is entitled to the 
requested transcripts because the lack of them "functions as a procedural bar to the 
review of Mr. Collins' appellate sentencing claims on the merits." (Appellant's brief, 
p.13.) This argument reflects either a misrepresentation or a misunderstanding of 
Warren as the Court in Warren clearly addressed the sentencing claim before it, but 
affirmed due to the lack of a "more complete record" or "argument by Warren as to why 
the sentence was unreasonable." Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 171. Collins 
also claims "the Warren opinion indicates that [the lack of transcripts] would be 
presumed to support the district court's decision to execute the original sentence." 
(Appellant's brief, p.14.) Nothing in Warren suggests that the absence of irrelevant 
transcripts would be presumed to support the district court's opinion in this case. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Collins also claims that if 
he can make a "colorable argument" that he needs "items" to complete a record, the 
state must "prove that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal." 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) Mayer does not support this argument. Mayer was convicted on 
non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and he appealed, challenging the 
sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. kl at 190. 
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The appellate court denied his request for a trial transcript at government expense on 
the basis of a local rule providing that verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be 
provided at government expense only for felonies. ~ at 191-93. The issue was not 
whether Mayer was entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a 
verbatim transcript of his trial. lg_,_ at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar 
issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that the 
government need not provide transcripts that were not "germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96). 
However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary to 
assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the defendant with 
resources to pay his own way." lg_,_ at 195. "Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as 
in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the 
State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an 
effective appeal on those grounds." lsL 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must establish 
that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. lsL at 194. Only after 
the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is established and a 
colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant will the burden shift to 
the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some record other than a verbatim 
transcript will be adequate. lg_,_ at 194-95; see also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 
227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether a requested record is necessary, the Court should 
consider the "value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal," but 
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the standard does not require "a showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular 
case" and the Court may take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Collins' appeal is timely only from the district court's order revoking his probation. 
The record related to that order is complete. Collins has failed to establish that the 
requested transcripts are necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review 
the court's order. Nothing in the record suggests that the transcripts Collins requested 
in his augmentation were relied upon by the district court in relation to the revocation of 
Collins' probation. Because Collins failed to make a showing of germaneness and 
colorable need for the requested transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because 
all of the evidence before the district court is in the appellate record, that record is 
adequate for appellate review, and Collins has failed to establish a violation of his due 
process rights. 1 Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Collins also argues that the denial of his request to augment the record on 
appeal with an irrelevant transcript denied him equal protection. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-
16.) The Court of Appeals in Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection 
mandates augmentation of all transcripts the appellant desires, stating: 
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. Morgan was 
afforded the opportunity to designate not only the standard clerk's record, 
but also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's record on 
appeal. He had time to review the record and make any objections, 
corrections, additions, or deletions prior to settling of the record, pursuant 
to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho 
1 As a component of his due process claim, Collins also argues that the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-16.) Because 
Collins has failed to show that the requested transcripts are necessary, or even 
relevant, for appellate review of the district court's order revoking his probation, there is 
no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has deprived Collins of effective 
assistance of counsel on this appeal. 
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Appellate Rules, and his failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts 
in his motion to augment the record, precluded him from including the first 
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's motion 
to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, indigent or 
otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested. 
Morgan at 5. Collins' equal protection claim fails for the same reasons. 
While Collins acknowledges that Morgan "does directly deal with the issues 
raised in this appeal," he argues, "at this point this case is not final." (Appellant's brief, 
p.12.) Although Morgan is not yet final, it is nevertheless persuasive authority that 
Collins' claims lack merit. 
Collins is entitled to a record adequate for appellate review of the district court's 
order revoking his probation and nothing more. He has failed to show that the 
requested transcripts are relevant to appellate review, much less necessary for 
adequate appellate review. Having failed to make any such showing, his motion to 
augment the record with irrelevant transcripts that were not relied upon by the district 
court is properly denied. Having failed to show his due process and equal protection 
rights were implicated, much less violated, by that denial, Collins has failed to show any 
basis for relief. 
11. 
Collins Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Court's Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Collins asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion either by 
revoking his probation or by not sua sponte reducing his sentence upon revoking 
probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-20.) Collins has failed to establish an abuse of the 
district court's discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion By Revoking Collins' 
Probation 
After finding that Collins violated his probation by (1) failing to attend and 
successfully complete his programming, (2) using marijuana on or about May 17, 2011, 
and (3) using marijuana on or about July 20, 2011, the court revoked Collins' probation. 
(R., pp.174-75.) On appeal, Collins argues that the district court abused its discretion 
by revoking his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-18.) Collins has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion. 
"Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court." LC.§ 19-2601(4). 
The decision to revoke probation is also within the court's discretion. State v. Sanchez, 
149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 
381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). In reviewing a district court's decision to 
revoke probation, this Court employs a two-step analysis. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 
233 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted). First, the Court considers whether the defendant 
actually violated his probation. .!st "If it is determined that the defendant has in fact 
violated the terms of his probation, the second question is what should be the 
consequences of that violation." .!st A district court's decision to revoke probation is a 
discretionary one that will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that 
discretion . .!st 
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Collins was not a model probationer. Initially, after pleading guilty to aggravated 
assault, the district court gave Collins a withheld judgment and placed him on probation 
for four years. (R., pp.106-11.) Collins absconded probation. (R., pp.114-15, 127-28.) 
The district court revoked the withheld judgment and imposed and executed an 
underlying sentence of five years with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., 
pp.131-32.) After the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Collins' 
sentence and gave him another chance at probation. (R., pp.141-43.) One of the 
special conditions of that probation warned Collins: 
The Defendant has had prior opportunities for probation and a rider. The 
Defendant is advised that this is his/her final opportunity at probation. 
Failure to abide by the conditions of probation resulting in a motion for 
. probation violation, will, if proven or admitted, be considered a violation of 
a fundamental condition of probation which will result in imposition of the 
underlying sentence. 
(R., p.142 (emphasis original).) Despite this clear warning, Collins again violated his 
probation. (R., pp.158-60, 169.) The district court considered alternatives to revoking 
Collins' probation but ultimately, as promised, revoked Collins' probation and executed 
his underlying sentence. (R., pp.174-75.) As explained by the district court, in order to 
be successful in rehabilitation, Collins needed consequences. (11/10/2011 Tr., p.38, 
Ls.5-24.) 
Contrary to Collins' assertions on appeal, having a supportive family and being 
enrolled in college (Appellant's brief, p.18) do not establish an abuse of the district 
court's discretion, especially where Collins violated his probation while enrolled at 
school and enjoying familial support. Collins has failed to establish an abuse of the 
district court's discretion. 
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D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Not Sua Sponte Reducing 
Collins' Sentence Pursuant To Rule 35 
After the district court revoked Collins' probation, it executed Collins' underlying 
sentence of five years with three years fixed. (R., pp.174-75.) On appeal, Collins 
argues that the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte reducing his 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.) Collins has failed to show 
an abuse of discretion. 
Upon revoking probation, the district court may, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
35, reduce an underlying sentence sua sponte. I.C.R. 35. A court's decision not to 
reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established 
standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 978, 783 P.2d 
315, 317 (Ct. App. 1989) ). Where a sentence is legal, those standards require an 
appellant to establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 
136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614,615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 
11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 
615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of 
protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 
(1978). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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Collins' criminal character supports the sentence executed by the district court. 
Collins lied to the court. After Collins failed at his second opportunity at probation, the 
district court requested an updated PSI. (9/1/2011 Tr., p.19, Ls.17-25.) The updated 
PSI stated that Collins had used methamphetarnine and that his Facebook page 
referenced an unauthorized trip to Salt Lake City and drug use. (PSI, pp.2, 8-10.) 
During his first disposition hearing, Collins disputed those findings. Through counsel he 
claimed that he "never used methamphetamine in his life, has never had a hot UA for 
methamphetamine." (10/20/2011 Tr., p.7, Ls.6-16.) He also claimed "that Alex Collins' 
Facebook page, that the presentence investigator is referring to, is not his page. That's 
not him." (10/20/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-24; see also p.12, Ls.17-19 ("And as an aside, 
Judge, my client tells me he is not even on Face Book [sic]. He has never utilized Face 
Book [sic]").) The district court, based on Collins' representations, decided that the 
presentence report should be reviewed. (10/20/2011 Tr., p.19, L.21 - p.20, L.3.) 
In her updated reports, the presentence investigator verified that Collins had a 
"hot UA" for methamphetamine use and appended the report to the PSI. (PSI, pp.43, 
45.) Regarding Collins' Facebook page, the presentence investigator also appended a 
phone conversation between Collins and his sister, recorded by the Ada County Jail, 
from the day before his first disposition hearing. (PSI, p.50.) In that phone call, the 
presentence investigator explained, 
Mr. Collins states the "PSI lady ripped me apart" and states information in 
the PSI report was "bulls[***]." Mr. Collins says during the phone call that 
his Facebook page references him going to Salt Lake City but there is no 
proof it is him. He states the page references "cheese" and that the 
investigator believed that was slang for meth, and Mr. Collins states, "It's 
slang for money you f[***]ing retard .... " Mr. Collins then tells [his sister], 
approximately 6 minutes into the phone call, she needs to sign into his 
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Facebook page and block his profile. She tells him it is already set up that 
way and that is why the investigator could only get partial information. Mr. 
Collins tells his sister his login is alexcollins1207@gmail.com and his 
password is Alexcollins. 
This investigator verified that the email Mr. Collins provided on this phone 
call is the same email address provided to his former Probation Officer 
Tom Ledbetter, which is contained in his offender file. It should also be 
noted that Mr. Collins reported he did not have a phone number for his 
sister ... however, the Ada County Jail was able to provide almost daily 
phone calls between the two. 
During the second disposition hearing, the prosecutor noted that ColHns' blatant 
lies demonstrated "a serious problem with [his] thinking and his refusal to accept 
responsibility for his actions," which made him a danger to the community and unfit for 
community supervision. (11/10/2011 Tr., p.24, L.19 - p.25, L.11.) Defense counsel 
also expressed that Collins "has put me in a very difficult position.... I can tell you that 
in my conversations with him this is a 23-year-old man who made some representations 
to me which I then made to the Court which are now we know to be false." (11/10/2011 
Tr., p.27, Ls.13-21.) The district court agreed, letting Collins know, "Mr. Collins, I will 
have to tell you that you win one prize, in nine years on the bench I have never had 
anyone who lied that much at [a] sentencing hearing." (11/10/2011 Tr., p.33, Ls.14-17.) 
Considering Collins' criminal character, the district court correctly determined that his 
best opportunity for rehabilitation would be in the penitentiary. (See 11/10/2011 Tr., 
p.38, Ls.16-19.) 
Collins has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Collins' probation 
in light of Collins' multiple failures to comply with the terms of that probation. The 
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district court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte reducing Collins' sentence 
upon revoking his probation. The district court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
revoking Collins' probation. 
DATED this 5th day of December, 2012. 
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